How the conflict that erupted in Darfur in 2003 still heavily impacts Sudan today
On April 11 2019, Omar Al-Bashir was removed from his position as President of Sudan, ending his 30-year dictatorial regime. Demands for his transfer to the Hague, for him to stand trial before the International Criminal Court (ICC), were invigorated, ten years after the first arrest warrant issued against him.
UN agencies estimate that over 300,000 people died as a result of the conflict in Darfur and nearly 3 million were forcefully displaced to escape the crimes committed mainly by Sudanese security forces and their proxies from the Janjaweed militia.
More than 300,000 refugees continue to live in the 13 camps established in Eastern Chad, and Darfur still counts 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). While armed clashes have decreased in various parts of Darfur, they remain particularly acute in others, including in the Jebel Marra, causing casualties mainly among civilians.
Since the outbreak of the conflict in Darfur, not a single effective measure of justice has been taken by national authorities to bring the crimes to an end, to ensure that those responsible are held accountable and to provide reparation to the victims. Omar Al-Bashir, who remains under arrest in the Kober prison, will most probably not be extradited by Sudanese authorities and thus not charged for crimes committed in Darfur.
At least
300000
people died as a result of the conflict in Darfur
Almost
3
million were forcefully displaced
Throughout the conflict, rapes and other forms of sexual violence were widespread
- 2003
Outbreak of the conflict in Darfur
Outbreak of the conflict in Darfur
juillet 23, 2003The conflict which erupted in Darfur in 2003 mainly opposed two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to the Government of Sudan (GoS) and its proxies from the Janjaweed militias. The rebels accused authorities in Kharthoum of marginalizing the Darfur region by excluding its population from governing positions and not ensuring a fair distribution of the country’s wealth.
- 2005
The UN intervenes
The UN intervenes
janvier 25, 2005January 25, the UN Commission of Inquiry (CoI) found that the Government of Sudan (GoS) and Janjaweed militias were responsible for serious violations in Darfur that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity and recommended that the United Nations Security Council refers the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.
March 31, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) refers the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the UNSC decided to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC.
In June 2005, the ICC opened an investigation on alleged genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the region. This was the first ICC investigation on the territory of a non-State Party to the ICC Statute.
- 2005
Sudan establishes the Special Court for the crimes committed in Darfur
Sudan establishes the Special Court for the crimes committed in Darfur
juillet 23, 2005Sudan established the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur (the Special Court) to try those responsible for the events in Darfur. However, the Prosecutor’s investigations, many international reports (especially those of the UN and of international NGOs), as well as FIDH’s recent investigation have revealed that this Court has only addressed a few cases without relation to the serious crimes committed in Darfur over the past 14 years.
- 2007
The ICC delivers its first two arrest warrants
The ICC delivers its first two arrest warrants
avril 27, 2007After nearly two years of investigation, the ICC issued its first two arrest warrants in the Darfur situation, against a GoS official – Ahmad Harun – and a Janjaweed commander – Ali Kushayb.
- 2009
The ICC issues its first arrest warrant against Omar Al Bashir
The ICC issues its first arrest warrant against Omar Al Bashir
mars 4, 2009Omar Al Bashir was the first sitting Head of State to be targeted by the ICC. He’s suspected of five counts of crimes against humanity and two of war crimes, including, but not limited to charges of murder, extermination, forcible transfer, rape, torture and pillaging. On 12 July 2010, the ICC issued a second arrest warrant against Omar Al Bashir for genocide committed against the Massalit, Fur and Zaghawa ethnic groups.
- 2009
African Union adopts a resolution supporting Bashir and criticizing the ICC
African Union adopts a resolution supporting Bashir and criticizing the ICC
juillet 3, 2009On 3 July 2009, at the African Union (AU) summit that took place in Sirte, Libya, Heads of States agreed to support Al-Bashir, only a few months after the ICC had issued a warrant for his arrest. In their decision, AU Heads of States refused to cooperate with the Court, criticised the inopposability of the right to immunity before the ICC and solicited the UNSC to apply Article 16 of the ICC Statute to suspend the proceedings against al-Bashir.
- 2017
Tripartie agreement between Chad, Sudan and UNHCR for the voluntary repatriation of refugees
Tripartie agreement between Chad, Sudan and UNHCR for the voluntary repatriation of refugees
mai 23, 2017On 31 May 2017, Sudan, Chad and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) signed a tripartite agreement to organise the voluntary return of the hundreds of thousands Darfur refugees currently living in camps in Estern Chad. As of October 2018, UNCHR had assisted only 353 refugees to return to Darfur.
- 2018
UNSC Resolution drastically reducing UNAMID forces
UNSC Resolution drastically reducing UNAMID forces
juillet 23, 2018The African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was established on 31 July 2007 by the UNSC to protect civilians and humanitarian personnel and contribute to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. In 2018, UNSC adopted a new resolution to extend UNAMID’s mandate but to considerably reduce the number of its troops by more than half.
- 2018
Widespread protests break out across Sudan, demanding for Bashir’s fall
Widespread protests break out across Sudan, demanding for Bashir’s fall
décembre 23, 2018Protests broke out across Sudan on 19 December 2018. While initially focused on denouncing increases in prices of basic commodities, the Sudanese revolution quickly developed into calling for the resignation of Omar Al-Bashir, leading to a violent response from security agencies. At least 225 people were killed and thousands more were arrested, some of whom were allegedly subjected to torture. Soon after the starting of the protests, Omar Al-Bashir tried to blame the revolt on Darfuris.
- 2019
The Sovereign Council of Sudan
The Sovereign Council of Sudan
août 20, 2019A transitional government, the Sovereign Council (SC), was established after the signing of the 17 August 2019 power-sharing agreement. The SC is headed by the military for the first 21 months of the transition, and a civilian for the last 18 months of the transition period, according to the agreement.
Civilians in Darfur continue to bear the brunt of insecurity
“I went back. I had been told the situation had changed, but nothing has changed. Going back for now is impossible. I don’t even dream of going back. Before we go back to Darfur, the criminals who attacked us must leave the country. For now, they are still there.”
A.A, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, April 2018
Before the outbreak of the December 2018 protests and the removal of Omar Al-Bashir from power, the Government of Sudan’s political narrative on Darfur was meant to persuade that the security situation in the region had come to normalization. The reality is however much more complex. Security remains a major challenge in Darfur, where armed and political violence perpetuate at significant levels.
Armed clashes continue in the Jebel Marra and the region remains home to multiple armed militias. The disarmament campaign launched by the authorities in August 2017 is seen by several observers as a cosmetic measure. Besides, Sudanese authorities continue using political violence against Darfurians: arbitrary arrests and detention, acts of torture and other serious human rights violations continue to be perpetrated recurrently against students, human rights defenders, political opponents. Such violence has been particularly acute since the outbreak of the protests in December 2018.
Jebel Marra: epicenter of violence
primarily impacting civilians since 2003
Throughout 2018, heavy armed clashes have been reported on several occasions in south-eastern, western and northern Jebel Marra between the SLA/AW – the remaining active armed group in Darfur – and government forces. These clashes have primarily impacted civilians in the Jebel Marra, including killings, rapes and other forms of sexual violence, acts of torture, looting, burning of villages, forced displacement.
“I have been thinking of going back to Darfur. When the situation will be fixed, I will. Until then, I won’t. We receive information indicating that the situation remains insecure”.
A.E, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, April 2018
“In Darfur, the situation has not changed. We recently heard that the chief of a village was killed by Janjaweed.”
A.I, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, April 2018
The disarmament campaign: a cosmetic measure?
A disarmament process was launched by the previous government following adoption of a presidential decree on August 8, 2017 with two distinctive phases: a voluntary one and a non-voluntary one.
Government statistics showed that over 65,000 weapons had been collected since the beginning of the voluntary campaign whereas over 700,000 weapons are registered to civilians in Darfur. However, arms collection operations focused on civilian-owned licensed weapons while regular armed groups, militia, and armed resistance movements kept their weapons.
The rapid Support Forces (RSF)
Janjaweed militias were integrated within the Sudanese security apparatus from mid 2013, mainly to respond to growing discontent towards authorities and to help them confront increasing rebel activity in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as “Hemeti”, was amongst the few Janjaweed leaders to remain loyal to the authorities and was chosen to lead the force that was going to be named the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). RSF were initially placed under the command of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), then officially integrated within Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) but they gradually started functioning as a distinctive branch of the security apparatus, placed under the direct command of Sudan’s former President Omar Al-Bashir. Prior to his fall, and given his growing mistrust of the army, Omar Al-Bashir was almost entirely relying on RSF for his protection against any kind of protest.
“The Sudanese government takes the weapons during the day and redistributes them at night. The situation remains the same in Sudan.”
A.C, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, April 2018
Politically instigated violence remains pervasive
When protests broke out across Sudan since 19 December 2018, Omar Al-Bashir was quick on accusing Darfurians of being the main instigators, with a view to discredit the movement. Sudanese authorities have regularly attempted to blame people from Darfur whenever there were moments of unrest occurring in other parts of the country, including Khartoum. This time, such narrative, primarily aimed at dividing and weakening the protest movement, completely failed. Protests were organized throughout the country, including in Darfur, with similar demands for regime change and justice for past crimes.
Over the past few years, in particular since early 2018, FIDH and ACJPS have documented and denounced several cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, including judicial harassment of human rights defenders or lawyers in Sudan, including from Darfur.
Untimely downsizing for UNAMID
in a context where rapes and sexual violence remain widespread
“I went back to Beida two years ago for funerals. This was the first time I came back. The situation had not changed. Arabs continued to bother us. They continue beating people, they let their animals eat your crops and destroy your fields. I would like to go back but I can’t. The country needs first to be free. For it to be free, I would like to see that the weapons of the government are taken away.”
A.F, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, April 2018
In June 2017, the UNSC adopted a resolution renewing the mandate of UNAMID until 30 June 2018, while deciding to drastically draw down the mission’s troop and police strength.
Crimes in Darfur are perpetrated in a context in which the authorities abhor any action aimed at documenting violations by independent human rights organisations. The authorities have also strictly limited the scope of UNAMID’s operations, since its deployment to the country. These obstacles significantly contribute to the continued perpetration of crimes, to crimes being relegated to oblivion and to the widespread impunity of the perpetrators.
Rapes and other forms of sexual violence remain widespread and unpunished
Sexual crimes were one of the most salient facets of the conflict in Darfur. Most of these crimes were committed at the hands of Sudanese security forces and their allies within the Janjaweed militia, who have so far enjoyed complete impunity. Such crimes, perpetrated for strategic and opportunistic reasons, were widespread and systematic. Today, sexual violence against civilians remains widespread throughout Darfur. Sexual violence in Darfur has had devastating effects on the civilian populations. Families and entire communities have been destroyed or suffer long-term consequences, given the serious physical, psychological and social impacts.
16 years after the outbreak of conflict, the scars are still very apparent. The situation of victims of sexual violence remains characterized by a total absence of justice and reparation from authorities who continue to deny the occurrence of conflict-related sexual violence. Since its creation in 2005, the Special Criminal Court on the events in Darfur has not dealt with a single case of rape or other forms of sexual violence.
“Since I arrived here [in 2010], I never went back to Darfur. But according to the information we receive, they continue to rape, to kill people, all that continues. The Arabs are settled in our village. We cannot return. We don’t even think about it.”
A.O, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, April 2018
Going back to Sudan is hardly an option for refugees
While the 30-year dictatorship of Omar Al Bashir has come to an end and the military power is crushing peaceful protesters in blood, around 343,000 Sudanese refugees continue to live in 19 camps established right outside the Western border of the country, in Eastern Chad. Darfur also still counts 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).
The situation of refugees in Eastern Chad remains ambivalent. On the one hand, the living conditions in the camps are very harsh. However, the overwhelming majority of refugees express their satisfaction at receiving humanitarian assistance and their wish that it could continue for as long as necessary. Above all, the difficulties encountered in the camps are largely counterbalanced by the highly volatile security situation in Darfur and the outright refusal of refugees to return to their lands as long as they are occupied by the former Janjaweeds and that the government continues hosting those responsible for the crimes perpetrated in Darfur.
Harsh living conditions in refugee camps
especially for women and girls
Chad still hosts 343,000 refugees who fled the conflict in Darfur. They are located primarily in the Eastern part of the country, along the border with Sudan, and spread within 19 refugee camps.
In UNHCR camps, refugees continue benefiting from access to food, water, health-care, education and for some of them, land and income-generating activities. But these services are limited and largely insufficient for women who are often sole householders and have to take charge of several children. Health facilities in and outside the camps are insufficient. Many women and men who were interviewed have been subjected to sexual violence during the conflict and did not have access to adequate treatment or counselling.
Many women raise their children alone. They lost their husbands during the conflict, or are separated and do not receive any help. In some of the camps such as Goz Amer, refugees can have access to pieces of land they can farm.Refugees can have access to education, but schools are not free (except before 4 years old) and facilities are lacking. In and around camps, jobs are scarce. Few refugees have been able to buy cattle back after theirs were taken by Janjaweeds, or land for farming. Some refugees rent pieces of land to Chadians or do low-income activities such as brick-making and house building. Their main concern is to survive and feed their family, pending a more durable solution.
“The day of the attack, we ran. They came and brought the women to the valley. They raped us. I suffered for 3 years. I was feeling the pain, general pain, in my shoulder, my back, my waist. Now it’s ok. I got traditional treatment with hot water. At the hospital, I was shameful to tell them I was raped so I didn’t say it. […] The Janjaweed told me that if I said anything, they would kill me.”
F.Z.A, 45, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, 20 April 2018
Sexual violence and domestic abuse
Acts of sexual violence outside the camps are perpetrated by men from the host community against girl refugees while they are getting water or firewoods in isolated areas. The number of cases could be much higher as sexual violence is rarely reported, mainly because of fear of stigmatisation and family settlements.
If early marriages are widespread in Sudan, studies show that rates of early marriages tend to grow in conflict situations and humanitarian settings. For poor families, marrying their daughter alleviates financial hardship. It also reduces the risks that their daughter loses her “virginity” before she gets married. Girls face increased risks of marital rape and other forms of sexual violence, but also physical and psychological violence within marriage. Early marriage also exposes girls to early pregnancies, which can have severe consequences on their physical and psychological health and reduces their opportunities in terms of education.
Women also face domestic violence, risk of abandonment and more limited access to assets related to the control exercised by men over resources. Domestic violence can be physical, sexual, psychological and economical, and is exacerbated after conflicts due to unemployment and lack of access to health care after the trauma of the war, including the absence of counselling services within the camps.
“It was 2 years after I came here. I was 12. We went to the mountain [with other girls]. Arab people found us, […] they were holding guns. They were 3. They are from this country, Chad, and spoke the arab language. They had uniforms of the army, black, green, white, blue, and soldier shoes. They wanted to talk to us so we ran. […] After I fell down, they came and captured me and raped me. But I don’t remember. After, they left and people came to bring me back home. […] They took me to the hospital. At the hospital, I was tested (not sure if I was tested for HIV) and the doctors told me I was raped. […] They gave me injections and a medicine. And they never said anything to me after. I stayed there for 2 days. After they took me back to my home. […] I don’t feel pain, but sometimes, I feel sad. Up to now, I’m not feeling well. Now I’m sad talking about it. I feel better when I take medicines. I never talked to anyone, and no one never asked me about this. This is the first time I talk about it.”
A.I.I, 23, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, 25 April 2018
“In Djabal, 3 years ago, my family wanted to marry me but I refused it. He was a man from my far away family, around 35. My father’s brother pushed for this marriage, but he saw that it was going to be difficult and dropped. I said no because he was bigger than me. Two years ago, I got married. I didn’t choose him. My mother did. I didn’t want any problem. He’s 30. I know other girls who were forcibly married. It happens a lot.”
M.O.D, 20, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, 19 April 2018
“What I live here exceeds what I have lived in Darfur. When I arrived, I was 14, my mother forced me to marry an old man. He was around 50 and already had two wives. I didn’t want to marry him at all. When I was brought at his house, I was hiding all the time. He ended up forcing me to have sex with him. This marriage lasted for two months. He was my first husband, I got married twice after that.”
A.A.A, 25, a woman interviewed in the Goz Amer refugee camp, 23 April 2018
“I have problems with my husband, he doesn’t support me. He takes my money and gives it to his other wives, and if I say anything, he beats me. He gave me all the responsibilities for the children, he doesn’t support them.”
H.M.I, 28, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, 20 April 2018
“[My husband] wanted to divorce me because I didn’t have anything, no items, at my home. I asked him to help me to buy items. He said no […]. When we were at the farm, I wanted to go to the camp to take distribution and see my mother, but he refused. My ration card is with my mother. My husband said my mother could take the distribution. […] I went anyway, he beat me and I fell down.”
F.M.I, 31, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, 21 April 2018
“We don’t want to go back”
The repatriation process of Sudanese started in April 2018 with a group of 53 refugees who left the Irdimi camp in North Eastern Chad and traveled up to the Tina reception centre in North Darfur. Since then, around 4,000 people have voluntarily returned to Sudan. The Sudan’s refugee Commission affirms that “50% of the 300 000 Sudanese refugees in Chad have expressed a desire to return to the country”. Testimonies collected by FIDH and ACJPS express completely different views from the refugees. The security situation in the region remains precarious. While armed clashes have decreased in various parts of Darfur, they remain particularly acute in others, including in the Jebel Marra, causing casualties mainly among civilians.
“I went back to Darfur. On March 10th I was in El Geneina, on the 4th I was in Zalengei, on the 5th in Garsila. They say everything is well, but nothing has changed. There are still rapes, death, nothing is solved. Darfur is empty. Go back to do what? Going back is impossible, I don’t want to go. In March, in Kabar, there was a rape during the night, nothing was done. In Bindis and neighboring villages, there were 3 cases of rape of 15 year-old girls. Nobody took them to the hospital. On the radio, on TV, we hear that criminals are catching girls.”
Group interview with women community leaders, 19 April 2018, Djabal camp, Goz Beida
Despite the difficulties in the camps, the refugees are unanimous, they are determined to stay, together, as long as the security situation in Darfur does not improve. The gravity of the crimes committed against civilians and to provide justice and reparation to victims, as well as the presence of those responsible throughout the region, including within the government itself, are major obstacles to any genuine repatriation process. Most importantly, the international community’s growing disregard for the serious crimes committed in Darfur has, throughout the years, exacerbated the plight of victims. In their last report, the UN Panel of experts on Sudan indicated that “Sexual violence also affects the possibility of return of civilians to their places of origin”.
In Darfur, with approximately one third of the population being either refugee or internally displaced, any meaningful peace process that would not adequately address the needs and grievances of those who have been forcefully displaced would prove ineffective on the long run.
According to the Sudanese civil law (1984)
In Sudan, according to the Hawakeer system (customary land management), lands belong to the Sultan and are attributed to citizens for farming. Yet under The Civil Transactions Act, 1984, land may be attributed to a person who occupied it for ten years.
These competing legal systems leave IDPs who return to their lands with no legal argument for their land claims.However, according to the 1984 Act, the change of ownership should take place in good faith, and not by force, as in the case of lands taken by the Janjaweed. The absence of good faith was raised before the Civil Court in El Geneina, which ruled that as the war had ended, citizens could now claim their lands.
However, if a civilian wishes to summon the person occupying her/his land, and that person happens to be a member of the RSF, summons cannot be issued as RSF personnel enjoy immunity.
Chapter IV of The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) sets out principles and processes for restitution of property and assistance for the full integration of the returnees into their communities, including restoring their rights to land property and compensating them for the damages and losses caused by the conflict.1 While, Sudan’s Draft Constitutional Charter for the 2019 Transitional Period lists issues of land and tribal lands (Hawakir) as an essential aspect for peace negotiations, it is essential that Sudanese laws be amended to allow for the restitution of property of returnees, in line with the DDPD.
“As long as there is no peace, I will not leave. I still suffer from the consequences. We are informed of what is happening in Darfur, the Janjawid have just attacked recently. When it comes to going back, these people need to understand and put an end to the current conflict. It is necessary to rebuild villages, to give young people access to an income.”
A.A.A, 25
“They shot me, I don’t want to go back. If Darfur became very good and all the people were going back, I would go with them. I will follow my people and go with them.”
D.M.A, 35, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, 20 April 2018
Where does justice stand?
“I wish all the criminals of our country are caught, especially the government of Sudan and our president. I wish there was real security. If the situation becomes calm again, I will return, with security, without the will of another person but with my own will.”
A.O, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, April 2018
On 11 April 2019, Al-Bashir was arrested, placed in detention in the Kober prison and later charged by Sudan’s public prosecutor with corruption and illegal acquisition and use of foreign funds. According to media sources, Al-Bashir’s verdict in his corruption trial is to be delivered in December 2019.
Ahmad Harun and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein were also reportedly arrested on the same day. Following Al-Bashir’s arrest, demands for his transfer to the Hague, for him to stand trial before the International Criminal Court (ICC), were invigorated. So far, the Transitional Government had yet to indicate whether it would extradite Al Bashir to the Netherlands. Not a single charge was brought against him concerning the serious crimes committed in Darfur, illustrating, once again, Sudanese authorities’ unwillingness to provide accountability measures for victims of these crimes.
Incommensurate, ongoing and grave crimes
and their long lasting effect on civilians
Crimes of incommensurate scale and gravity were committed in Darfur and continue having long-lasting effects on victims. Yet, not a single meaningful accountability and reparation measure has been provided to the victims. The Special Criminal Court on the events in Darfur has proven to be inefficient and the ICC proceedings have been stalled mainly due to lack of cooperation. This rampant impunity has constituted a fertile ground for the continuation of crimes in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan. Demands for justice and reparation were seen as pre-conditions to any repatriation to Sudan.
In 2005, the Commission estimated that there were 1.65 million IDPs in Darfur, as a result of the conflict, and 200,000 refugees in Eastern Chad. 14 years later, these figures have either remained stable or have continued increasing, indicating that little progress has been made in terms of security or relocation measures for civilians. Darfur counts 2.6 million refugees and 335,000 refugees still live in Eastern Chad. New cases of forced displacement – as a result of clashes – continue to be reported.
Rapes and other forms of sexual violence continue to be perpetrated against civilians, and include high level of gang rapes. Cases of women being abducted and raped for several hours or days continue to be reported. Women in IDP camps remain the targets of sexual violence, while they collect wood and water. Cases of women becoming pregnant after having been raped remain common.
The international crimes committed in Darfur, including those committed in the early years of the conflict, continue having serious effects on civilians, until today, including physical, psychological and social effects.
“The war started in 2003 in our village of Djougouma, not far from Bindisi. One day, my husband and I went to the market in Bindisi. We met with Janjaweed. They wanted to rape me and take our belongings. They started hitting my husband and I. They took our money and animals. They started beating villagers, raping women and girls. After the attack, we decided to move to Sara Bourgou. But one day, I went to the market with my sister. We met with Janjaweed. My sister had her child in the back. The Janjaweed killed the child, raped my sister, raped me. They were about 20 of them. My sister and I were gang raped by a group of three men. […] As of today, I take injections for lower back pains and some pain killers. […] Today, I keep thinking about the rape. I think about it all the time. […] I do not expect anything in the future. I only want to see my children live. I never went back to my village and I don’t want to go back. The criminals are still there. We will go back when our country will be free […] My sister lives in the IDP camp of Kalma. We never saw each other since then. […]”
A.J, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, April 2018
“We were in the village of Ilele, not far from Beida. The war started there. Janjaweed came to take things from people. One day a large group of Janjaweed came to take everything we had. The people started to flee. My brothers, my mother and I left separately. I left to hide. I came across a group of Arabs. Maybe they were over 20. Three of them raped me. As I refused, one had a small pistol […] They hit me. I could not defend myself. They raped me one after the other. I do not know how long it lasted. They raped me until I fell unconscious. They left me on the ground […] They left me like that. […] My mother wanted to seek justice for me. But since it was Janjaweed who raped me, and since they had not disappeared, it was not worth it. […] When we arrived here in Chad, my family got me married. When my husband found that I had lost my virginity, he left”. […] Today I still feel pelvic pains. I often have a lot of thoughts about rape, which makes me feel dizzy […] I do not see a good future for me.”
A.N, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, April 2018
The failure of accountability mechanisms
to provide justice and reparation to victims
The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur
Sudan established the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur (the Special Court) in 2005. However, it appears that this court has only addressed a few cases without relation to the serious crimes committed in Darfur over the past years.
“Sudanese law does not provide for retroactivity, hence, the Court is incompetent to deal with international crimes”, a Darfur-based lawyer said.
Challenges relate to immunity, lack of evidence, time factor, lack of forensic evidence, no presence of the body, no confirmation of even the time of the incident…
Important shortcomings remain in the national legal framework
The Sudanese criminal laws do not adequately proscribe war crimes and crimes against humanity. The law provides wide powers to the executive and grants immunity from prosecution to many state agents. Such inadequacy was already raised in the report of the Commission of Inquiry, as well as in several subsequent reports made by various regional and international mechanisms.
“To access justice with this regime is almost impossible. We need a democratic regime respecting human rights. That’s the best atmosphere for people to get justice and reparation. Justice should not be compromised and discussed as a political interest for super power states. Victims suffer that their rights are violated.”
Interview with a lawyer from South Darfur, October 2018
The International Criminal Court
On April 27, 2007, the ICC issued its first arrest warrants in the Darfur situation, against Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Minister of the State for the Interior, and responsible of the “Darfur Security Desk”, and Ali Kushayb, senior tribal leader in the Wadi Salih locality and member of the Popular Defence forces (PDF).
Since then, the ICC has issued four other arrest warrants in the Darfur situation: two against Omar Al Bashir (March 2009 and July 2010), one against Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein (March 2012) and one against Abdallah Banda (September 2014). The ICC had issued earlier summons to appear against Bahar Idriss Abu Garda but the charges of war crimes were not confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.
12 years after issuance of the first arrest warrants, all but one case (The Banda case) remain at the pre-trial stage with the suspects at large and, until recently, most of them continued to hold senior positions in the government of Sudan. For a long time, Omar Al-Bashir has defied the warrants against him and traveled across the world.
Sudan has now emerged from isolation and has begun to act as a strategic partner, including acting on behalf of the European Union to control migratory flows to Europe, to facilitate talks particularly in relation to the conflict in South Sudan, and in participating, alongside Saudi Arabia, in the conflict in Yemen.
“I’m not aware of any accountability mechanism. I would like to complain but I don’t have enough strength. To whom I’m I going to complain? This is the same people in the government [in Sudan]. I don’t have the strength.”
A.G, a woman interviewed in the Djabal refugee camp, April 2018
Not a single condemnation
for international crimes committed in Sudan
at national, regional or international levels.
Before national courts
- Special Criminal Court for the Events in Darfur: 0 condemnation against government forces for the crimes committed during the conflict
- Common law justice: 0 condemnation against government forces for the crimes committed during the conflict
- Foreign national courts: BNP was fined $ 8.9 billion in 2014 by US courts for violating the US embargo targeting several countries, including Sudan. These practices have resulted in significant support for the Sudanese economy during the conflict period. The US Department of Justice said it planned to use the money paid by the French bank to compensate victims of abuses by the Sudanese regime during the period. No compensation has so far been paid to the victims.
Before regional mechanisms
- ACHPR: lack of accountability for the Sudanese State’s responsibility for human rights violations during the conflict
- African Court: has no jurisdiction for cases brought against Sudan. Sudan has failed to ratify the Protocol establishing the Court and to make the declaration under its article 34.6 allowing individuals and NGOs to directly seize the Court.
Before international courts
- ICC : 4 arrest warrants issued for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 1 arrest warrant for genocide. 6 suspects. All of them remain at large, except for Omar Al-Bashir who is facing corruption charges and has been placed in detention in Kober prison in Khartoum.
The ICC’s main fugitives
Ahmed Mohammed Harun
Suspected of 20 counts of crimes against humanity and 22 counts of war crimes allegedly committed in Darfur, Sudan.
Not in ICC custody.
Status: former Minister of the State for the Interior, and responsible of the “Darfur Security Desk”, hereby co-ordinating the different bodies of the government involved in the counter-insurgency, including the Police, the Armed Forces, the National Security and Intelligence Service and the Janjaweed militia
Warrant of arrest: 27 April 2007
Status of proceedings: The execution of the arrest warrant is pending
Ali Kushayb
Suspected of 22 counts of crimes against humanity and 28 counts of war crimes allegedly committed in Darfur, Sudan.
Not in ICC custody.
Status: senior tribal leader in the Wadi Salih locality and member of the Popular Defence forces (PDF), allegedly commanded thousands of Janjaweed militia from on or about August 2003 until on or about March 2004
Warrant of arrest: 27 April 2007
Status of proceedings: The execution of the arrest warrant is pending
Omar Al-Bashir
Suspected of five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts of war, and three counts of genocide allegedly committed in Darfur, Sudan.
Not in ICC custody.
Date of birth: 1 January 1944
Place of birth: Hoshe Bannaga, ShendiGovernorate in Sudan
Nationality: Sudanese
Current status: President of the Republic of Sudan from 16 October 1993 until 11 April 2019
First Warrant of arrest: 4 March 2009
Second Warrant of arrest: 12 July 2010
Status of proceedings: The execution of the arrest warrant is pending
Current location: Kober prison (Khartoum)
Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein
Suspected of 7 counts of crimes against humanity and 6 counts of war crimes allegedly committed in Darfur, Sudan.
Status: Current Minister of National Defence and former Minister of the Interior and former Sudanese President’s Special Representative in Darfur
Warrant of arrest: 1 March 2012
Status of proceedings: The execution of the arrest warrant is pending
3 members of rebel groups
Abdallah Banda
At large
Accused of three counts of war crimes committed in an attack against the African Union Peacekeeping Mission at the Haskanita Military Group Site in Darfur (Sudan). Not in ICC custody.
Date of birth: In or around 1963
Place of birth: Wai, Dar Kobe, North Darfur
Tribe: Zaghawa
Situation: Commander-in-Chief of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Collective-Leadership, one of the components of the United Resistance Front
Charges against him were confirmed after he appeared voluntarily before the Court.
Warrant of arrest: 11 September 2014.
The trial will commence pending the accused’s arrest or voluntary appearance. The ICC does not try individuals in their absence.
Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus
Case closed: suspect died
Accused of three counts of war crimes committed in an attack against the African Union Peacekeeping Mission at the Haskanita Military Group Site in Darfur (Sudan).
Status: Sudanese Liberation Army-Unity’s Chief of Staff (and later integrated into the Justice and Equality Movement)
Proceedings were terminated in 2013 after receiving evidence pointing towards his death
Bahar Idriss Abu Garda
Case closed: charges not confirmed by the ICC
Accused of three counts of war crimes committed in an attack against the African Union Peacekeeping Mission at the Haskanita Military Group Site in Darfur (Sudan).
Date of birth: 1 January 1963
Place of birth: Nana, North Darfur
Tribe: Zaghawa
Current situation: Chairman and General Coordinator of Military Operations of the United Resistance Front
Appeared voluntarily before the Court. On 8 February 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I declined to confirm charges of war crimes against Bahar Idriss Abu Garda
Take action
The removal of Omar Al-Bashir, ending a 30-year dictatorial regime, provides for a unique opportunity for the country’s new authorities and the international community to take demonstrative and concrete actions to combat impunity for past and present crimes in Sudan, and in particular, Darfur.
However, despite major political developments at a national level, which have led to the establishment of a Transitional Government, the security situation in the Darfur region remains unstable, and serious concerns regarding accountability for crimes committed during the previous regime and the recent peaceful uprisings continue to exist.
The people of Sudan need to be heard and concrete measures must be put in place to honor demands for long-lasting peace and justice.
Call out to decision makers:
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To the Trust Fund for Victims of the ICC